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INTRODUCTION 
Background and methodology 
In November 1995. on the basis of contributions from the Member States, the 
Commission drew up an initial comparative analysis 1 of the measures taken by the 
Member States to combat fraud and of the application of Article 209a of the EC Treaty. 
This document was presented in the form of a basic report, and raised the 
question of whether there was any point in continuing and completing the analysis in 
liaison with the Member States. The Council took note of this document and its main 
. ., 
cone lusiOns,- and accepted the Commission's suggestion that the work begun be 
continued. 
At the start of the following year. 3 the Commission presented a working 
document summmg up the situation on the follow-up action to be taken on the 
comparative analysis. The Ecofin Council of 8 July 1996 confirmed the "need to 
complete the comparative analysis of national anti-fraud systems'', referring to "the 
objective of an equivalent level of protection of the Communities' financial interests 
throughout Community temtory". 
On this basis, the Commission sent an additional questionnaire to the 
Member States in November 1996.+ Among the points for which it was decided to 
request further mformation were the issues of checks and administrative penalties, so that 
both the prevention and enforcement of fraud were covered. 
The subject of checks carried out by the Member States on the expenditure and 
revenue of the Umon was only touched on in the first phase of national reports, 
particularly as regards quantitative data. Th1s \vas mainly due to the short time limits for 
replies set in the spring of 1995. As the subject had, however, been at least partially 
addressed by some of them. an mitial methodological basis was available to build on. 
The subject of administrative penalties. however, was somewhat neglected in the 
first phase of the study. It was fe It that it would be useful to take another look at this 
aspect of combatmg fraud through non-criminal penalties. 
The emphasis was laid on the quantitative aspects (number of checks, rate of 
checks, rates of irregularity, number of penalties effectively applied). since the 
qualitative elements (development of legislation and administrative organisation to 
improve the fight against fraud) had been studied in detail in the first stage. 
Comparati1·e analys1s of the reports supplied by the Member States on nat10nal measures taken to 
combat wastefulness and the misuse of Commumty resources. and S_vntheszs Document. 
COM(95) 556 final. 
In two stages: at the Ecofin Council on 27 November 1995. and then the Madnd European 
Council on 15 and 16 December 1995. 
At the meeting of the Community Committee for the Coordmation of Fraud Prevention 
(COCOLAF) on 15 January 1996. 
In the form of a letter from the Commission's Secretary-General dated 20 November 1996, 
accompamed by a supplementary questionnaire (document SEC(96) 9436). 
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Area of study 
The scope of the study excludes checks on the Community's direct cxpemilture 111 
order to concentrate un the expenditure for which the Member States are responsible for 
implementation, checks and penalties. It also excludes checks on agncultural 
expenditure, apart from the penalties applied in this field, in order to avoid asking the 
Member States for data which are already available and to take account of current 
Community legislation, which sets out in detail the procedures for checking EAGGF 
Guarantee Section expenditure. 
As for revenue, the questionnaire confines itself to those traditional own 
resources, checks and penalties which are governed by a specific approach. 
An effort was therefore made to tighten up the questionnaire by steering the 
analysis towards figures which show the level of protection of the Community's finances 
and to look for new ideas to move towards more effective and uniform protection. In 
doing this, the Commission was following the aim laid down in the Madrid European 
Council ..conclusions5 and subsequently crystallised in the new Article 280 of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. 6 This document takes the same approach and may, if necessary, serve as a 
reference for the institutions in making the best possible use of the new legal bas1s set up 
to combat fraud. 
Chronology of work and plan selected 
After the additional questionnaire was sent at the end of 1996, the Commission 
started to receive replies from some Member States in the first quarter of 1997, often in 
the form of an supplementary report to the first one, sent in the spring of 1995. However, 
it took until the first quarter of 1998 for all the replies to come in, at which point the 
Commission carried out a comparative analysis. Since they were relatively incomplete, 
the Commission tried to supplement the study by means of other sources. notably some 
of its annual reports7 and European Court of Auditors' reports. 
The comparative analysis report takes up the two subjects of the questionnaire, 
checks and administrative penalties, but it is structured by budget area: first traditional 
own resources, then the Structural Funds, and lastly, and only for the penalties 
component, the EAGGF Guarantee Section. 
The advantage of presenting it this way is to highlight the lmk between checks 
carried out, irregularities discovered and penalties applied in each field: this link is 
behind any assessment of anti-fraud activity. This is the \vay the additional questionn~me 
The Madrid European Council calls upon the Member States and the Institutions to ··adopt the 
necessary measures to ensure an equivalent level of protection throughout the Commumty and 10 
the Community budget ... as a whole"'. 
The new Article 280(4) of the Treaty of Amsterdam provides that '"the Council. act10g 10 
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after consulting the Court of Auditors. 
shall adopt the necessary measures m the fields of the prevention of and fight against fraud 
affectmg the financwl interests of the Commumty With a view to affordmg effective and 
equivalent protection m the Member States"'. 
Summary report on the communications by the Member States under Article 17( 3) of RegulatiOn 
No 1552/89. 
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was presented, and most Member States followed the same presentation m their 
contribution. 
So as not to form an appendix separate from the rest of the Article 209a study, 
and for the sake of readability, the supplementary report includes what was said about 
these two subjects in the initial responses, and puts them back into the correct perspective 
of the reference period for the whole of the study (1993-1994-1995). This improves the 
comparability of the data. 
1. OWN RESOURCES 
1.1. Initial data 
It may be useful to review what was written on this point as avenues to be 
explored in the summary report presented in 1995 (which included a component on 
VAT). 8 
''As regards the administrative organisation of fraud prevention, the national 
reports indicate on the whole that there is a great contrast between the protection of 
revenue and the protection of expenditure. Where revenue is concerned, customs and tax 
authorities have had long experience of fraud prevention and apply the same control 
methods to Community revenue as have proved their worth in decades of use at national 
level. Both national and Community revenue may thus be said to enjoy a high level of 
protection". 
This paragraph relates to administrative organisation, from the point of view of 
the principle of assimilation,9 without assessing the operational impact of the checks. 
However, adherence to the assimilation principle in administration does not answer the 
question of how effective anti-fraud systems are, how results of operational arrangements 
are measured, etc. Yet these are particularly important since recent trends have shown a 
significant increase in detected cases of fraud and irregularities in own resources. 
The value of irregularities detected 10 in the field of own resources rose from 
€577 million in 1994 to €1 billion in 1997. This represents 3.6% of own resources 
revenue collected in 1995, 5.8% in 1996 and 6.5% in 1997. It remains at 3.81% in 1998. 
However it is presented, known fraud has increased in this field since the comparative 
analysis report presented in 1995. 
This fact may be interpreted in various ways, but one cannot deduce from it a 
50% reduction, or even an erosion, in the effectiveness of own resources protection. On 
the contrary, the increase in cases of known irregularities is the positive result of 
cooperation between the departments responsible for the fight against fraud having been 
improved over several years. And this can be seen even more clearly since the 
10 
Comparatzve mwlysis mentioned above. note 1. point 1.1.2 a) description of departmental 
organisation- own resources- avenues to be explored p. 37. 
The principle laid down in Article 280(2) (ex-Article 209a) of the EC Treaty: "Member States 
shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community as 
they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests". 
Amount of irregularities detected in the field of own resources; figure for 1994-97 presented in the 
Commission's 1997 annual report on the fight against fraud, page 57. 
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concentration of enforcement activities in risk sectors, which are also those where the 
amounts at issue are the highest, is increasing all the time. 
An analysis of the data supplied by the Member States to the Commission allows 
a more precise definition of the issue. During the first phase of the study, the reports 
provided by the Member States dealing with qualitative aspects already showed a 
tendency to increase own resources checks, along with a rise in detected fraud. 
Among the Member States which have given precise figures since the initial phase, 
an increase in checks and in the cases of fraud detected car: be seen in three cases. France 
mentioned 180 000 comprehensive checks on imports carried out each year by Customs, 
together with 3 500 post-clearance checks, and discovered an increase in infringements (for 
industrial products, 21188 infringements in 1993, concerning €13.1 million, then 27 127 
infringements in 1994, concerning €40.4 million, due to large-scale fraud in the transit 
procedure in the cigarette sector). 
In 1995, the Dutch report showed a reduction of one third in the number of physkal 
checks Gn imports (from 157 716 in 1992 to 94 911 in 1993), while the amount of 
irregularities notified was increased threefold. 11 There too, the notification of important 
cases goes some way towards explaining the variations, but the general trend shown by the 
Netherlands is indeed towards more detailed checks, which may be fewer in number but 
take more time, on the basis of a better risk-assessment. 
Finally, in addition to a rate of physical checks on goods of 10 000 a year, Portugal 
indicated an increase in detailed post-clearance checks (67 in 1993, 105 in 1994), while 
Spain mentioned, in addition to the checks on release into free circulation and post-
clearance checks, an increase in the investigations carried out by the central departments 
(241 investigation procedures in 1993 and 320 in 1994). 
Less quantifiably, several reports highlighted the development of risk analysis (for 
example, Belgium cited a special department created to this end within the Direction 
national des recherches of the Customs administration). 
To close this brief review, it should be pointed out that administrative penalties 
imposed following checks carried out in the field of own resources were barely touched 
on in the first phase of the study. 
The Member States which indicated that they used out-of-court settlements or a 
system of administrative penalties for own resources did not provide quantitative data on 
this subject. 12 
Denmark's report was an exception to this in that it indicated the number and the 
amount of administrative fines imposed in 1993 and 1994 following checks on 
declarations, while noting that the vast majority of irregularities discovered were simply 
II 
12 
Between 1992 and 1993, a transition year for the entry into force of the single market, the rate of 
physical checks on goods in the Netherlands dropped from 7.7 to 5.1 %, while the amount of 
irregularities notified rose from €1.3 million to €5.8 million (Commission's 1994 annual report on 
the fight against fraud, p. 95). 
Comparative analysis cited above, p. 55, and comparative table, p. 59. 
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the result of errors and were not subject to fines. As a result, there was a relatively low 
·..:, ~·: of administrative fines, less than 0.5% of the amount of the duties concerned. 13 
1.2. Checks made on own resources 
Following the same model used by most of the national reports, the first table 
summarises the data notified for 1995. Some data for comparison over several years are 
then set out. 
Table 1 gives the information essential to determine an inspection rate as applied 
by the Member States: number of declarations accepted, checks. on import of the goods, 
post-clearance checks. In line with the presentation used by m~st of the national 
contributions, the data are presented by number of operations and not by value. 
13 
. . ./ ... 
The figures presented by Denmark in 1995 were as follows: 60 fines in 1993 for an amount of 
€24 158. compared with €23.8 million in repaid duties (a little over 0.1 %). In 1994 the proportion 
is slightly higher: 76 administrative fines for an amount of€46 159, compared with €10.6 million 
in repaid duties (0.4Y7c ). 
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Table No 1: own resources inspection, reference year 1995 
Member Import Import checks Post-clearance Rate of checks (aggregate) 
States declarations checks 
B - - - between 2 and 57c (1) 
DK - - - -
D - 1 921 469 36 459 (2) -
EL - - - -
E - - - -
F - 150 852 4 673 (3) 16.6% (4) 
IRL 319 419 62 064 - (5) 19.4% 
I 911 208 70 892 15 611 9.5% 
L 59 385 4 362 9 300 2317c 
NL - 116 011 3 339 -
A 567 551 148 706 2 346 26.6% (6) 
p 207 584 18 500 50 8.9% 
FIN 511 163 64 999 211 (7) 12.7!Jc 
s 1 245 000 168 578 573 13.6!Jc 
UK 4 068 313 58 176 (8) 1.4317c 
(I) Belgium states that it does not have detailed statistics on the frequency of checks carried out. However, 
the customs administratiOn ensures that inspection standards are adhered to. for example for physical 
checks on goods on release into free circulation or the transit procedure. 
(2) Figures includmg checks on own resources, import turnover tax and expenditure on the common 
organisation of export markets. 
(3) In addition to these 4 673 post-clearance checks, there are 844 320 deferred checks (documentary 
checks after removal of the goods). 
(4) The rate of checks shown by France in relation to the number of declarations 1s 5.2317c on release into 
free circulation and 11.42!Jc on post-clearance checks, including deferred and post-clearance checks. 
(5) Ireland states that the rate of post-clearance checks must reach 5%, according to its internal instructions, 
and that an estimate of this rate at certain customs offices would be 10%. 
(6) 8% of which. according to the Austrian report. applies to checks on the Union's own resources (the 
majority of the checks carried out in 1995 relate to the period prior to accession). 
(7) Post-clearance checks carried out in 1995 related to the penod prior to accession. with an inspection 
rate evaluated at 13. 717c. 
(8) The United Kingdom g1ves an overall figure covering physical or documentary checks on entry of the 
goods or post clearance. 
A certain disparity in the data collected, explained in the footnotes to the table, is 
not surprising. It results from the fact that the Member States are free to decide both how 
their systems for protecting own resources are organised (both from the point of view of 
checks and prevention, and from that of penalties) and how their results are presented to 
the Commission, apart from the most important cases notified under Community 
legislation. 
The disparity noted is also due to the considerable leeway in interpreting the 
Commission's requests. The Commission asked for the number of checks carried out, 
distinguishing those made on release into free circulation from post-clearance checks, 
and the rate of inspections in number and value. Most Member States gave the answer in 
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number; it appears that the inspection rate in value is more difficult to obtain, several 
Member States mentioning the administrative cost of a reliable answer on this subject. 
The table above therefore sets out the data in a number of operations, bearing in mind 
that the rate of checks by value is often higher, since the amount of post-clearance 
operatiOns is one of the most obvious criteria for risk analysis. 
The result is that the rates of checks carried out are, in most cases. close to or in 
excess of 10% of the declarations accepted on import, a result attained in the absence of 
any bindmg Community rule. Where national inspection rate norms are indicated 
(Belgium, Ireland), they tend tobe lower than the rates actual!~ carried out. 
The Member States have sometimes supplied additional 'information, making 
analysis over several years possible. It shows that checks have basically risen since the 
reference period 1993-95, a transition period after the single market came into force and 
the task of the customs services in the Member States was redefined. 
Qermany thus shows an increase in checks and verifications carried out on 
imports from 1 623 380 to 1 921 469 (data provided for 1993 to 1996), and an increase in 
post-clearance checks on firms (from 9 698 to 35 847 over the same period) . 
.. 
While import declarations have increased considerably (266 641 in 1993, 319 419 
m 1995), Ireland states that the number of physical checks has remained stable though 
the number of documentary checks has risen (from 21 410 in 1993 to 27 582 in 1994) 
which means that 1t is possible to maintain a stable inspectiOn rate of around 20%. 
Portugal's report, supplementing the information supplied during the first phase 
of the study, shows that there has been a near doubling of the level of checks on release 
into free circulation (9 500 in 1993, 18 500 in 1995) which, compared with the total 
number of operations checked, increases the inspection rate from 3.2 to 9%. 
Lastly. the Dutch case is somewhat specific: the reduction in the number of 
physical import checks, already mentioned above, appears in the 1993-95 figures 
(dropping from 139 232 in 1993 to 116 011 in 1995) but at the same time the number of 
detailed post-clearance checks carried out doubled (from 1 665 to 3 339 over the same 
penod). 
1.3. Link between checks carried out and the detection of irregularities 
The point of establishmg such a lmk goes beyond studying cases of irregularities. 
vvhich must be notified if they involve amounts of more than €10 000. It is rather to 
evaluate the different ways of protecting own resources by establishing a correlation 
between types of checks and results in the detection of irregularities. As in the previous 
table, the data given do not relate to value but to the number of checks carried out and 
irregularities detected. as per the information supplied by the Member States. 
. . ./ ... 
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Table No 2: irregularities detected through own resources checks, 1995 
import checks// post-clearance checks 
Member Import checks irregul::rrities rates of Post -clearance irregul::rrllie~ rates of 
States detected Irregul::rrity checks detected irregulan ty 
B - 3 019 - - 2917(1) -
DK - - - - - -
D 1 921 469 (2) - - 36 459 189 (3) -
EL - 11 050 (4) - - - -
E - - - - - -
F 150 852 24 121 (5) 15.4lJc 4 673 - (5) -
IRL 62 064 395 0 6lJc - 470 -
I 70 892 3 291 4.67c 15 611 3 453 22 !lJc 
L 4 362 12 0.37c 9 300 154 1.77c 
NL 116011 29 561 25.57c 3 339 540 16.2lJc 
A 148 706 - - 2 346 - -
p 18 500 5 (6) - 50 22 (6) -
FIN 64 999 6 500 107c (7) - - 3.67c (8) 
s 166 578 29 136 177c 573 6 390 (9) -
UK 58 176 (10) II 003 (10) 18.9!Jc 
( 1) In addition to these 2 917 customs infringements there ::rre 517 cases of undeclared imports. The number 
of irregul::rritles. includmg the 3 019 discovered on import. therefore comes to a total of 6 507. 
(2) These figures mclude checks on own resources. import turnover tax and expenditure on the common 
organisation of export m::rrkets. 
(3) Germany shows that the findings of the post-clearance checks led to repayments of €12.5 million and 
recoveries of€80.2 million in 1995. The figure of 189 cases. mvolving a total of€38.5 m1llion in 1995. IS 
an overall figure concernmg the cases notit!ed, of over € 10 000. found following the v::rr1ous checks carried 
out by the federal finance administration. 
(.t) S1mple customs infringements plus 1 047 cases of smuggling. 
(5) This is an estimate of the total of the irregulanties relating to ov.n resources (2/3 of the 36 181 
irregul::rrities di,covered in commercial operations). 
(6) Only irregul::rrities over €10 000. 
(7) 4.37c of v.hich relate to an mcorrect t::rriff classit!cat10n. 
(8) This is an estimate of the post-clearance checks during the 1992-94 penod precedmg Fmland's 
accession to the European Union. 
(9) Sweden's figures include simple errors detected in the cu,toms documents; it IS not. therefore. possible 
to assess the rate of detection of irregul::rrities in the strict sense. 
(10) As before. the figures provided by the Umted Kmgdom for the penod 1995-96 refer to the total 
number of physical or documentary checks. on import or post-cle::rrance; the irregul::rrities included ::rre mer 
€610. 
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The d1spant1es bet\veen the data presented in this second table are more 
surprismg. There are substantial discrepancies between the replies of certain Member 
States to this survey and the information that they supplied subsequently on the basis of 
Article 17(3) of RegulatiOn No 1552/89. Of the ten Member States which provided 
information on the number of irregularities in both cases, only Belgium presents 
comparable data. This inconsistency casts serious doubt on the reliability of the replies 
g1ven. It is true that progress has been made since 1995 in reducing the marked disparity 
between national communications on the activity and results of controls on traditional 
own resources: after detailed work in the own resources committee, a harmonised annual 
report model was made available to the Member States in 1997.1+ However, "analysis of 
the reports for 1998 shows that the results have largely failed to live up to expectations: 
the Commission feels that it cannot yet reach any completely valid conclusions in view of 
the absence of comparable or, in some cases, reliable data . ... this is the case lvith the 
inspection activity indicators, the results of inspections (establishment and recovery) and 
interpretation of the concept of 'cases of fraud and irregularities'". 15 
1he following developments should therefore be read with this inconsistency in 
mind. Only a few conclus1ons can be drawn from such data, and they must be considered 
with the greatest of caution. This proviso notwithstanding, the part of the questionnaire 
on the success of checks in detecting irregularities suggests a more positive finding on 
the effectiveness of the checks made than on expenditure. Risk analysis, informat1on and 
targeting of post-clearance checks mean that the system is relatively effective at detecting 
irregularities. A calculat1on of the average result puts it at 12%, which is one irregularity 
per nine checks. 
Obviously this is only an approximate number, the field being one in which the 
counting of checks may be disputed (but that of irregularities may not, in principle, now 
that a definition has been laid down in Community law. 16) For its part, the European 
Court of Aud1tors regularly observes that Community legislation is not applied by the 
customs authorities in an effective and homogeneous manner and that the checks carried 
out on this basis do not give equivalent results across the territory of the Community. 17 
The responses to this survey thus vary from one Member State to another and depending 
on the type of check. On this last point, the data presented show rates of detection which 
are generally higher, better targeted and more detailed in the case of post-clearance 
checks. 
14 
15 
I6 
17 
Commission Decision No 97/245 of 20 M:1rch 1997 (C(97) 800 final). 
CommiSSion Report (No BUDG/688/99) - Summary· report on the commwucations bv the 
Member States on thetr tmpection activities and findings and questions of principle relating to 
tradttwnal own resources, 1998, (Arttcle 17( 3) of Council Regulation { EEC. Euratom] 
No 1552/89 of the Counctl. 
Council Regulation (EC. Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the 
European Communities financial interests, OJ L 312.2311211995. Article 1(2): "''Irregu!:lfity' shall 
mean any Infringement of a provision of Commumty law resultmg from an act or omission by an 
economic operator, \Vhich has, or would have, the effect of prejudicing the general budget of the 
Communities or budgets managed by them, either by reducmg or losing revenue accruing from 
own resources collected directly on behalf of the Communities, or by an unjustified item of 
expenditure." 
See: Court of Auditors. Annual Report for 1995. p:1ra 1 45; Annual Report for 1996, p:1ras. 1.10. 
1.4 1. 1.66. 1.83 and I 118: Annual Report for 1997, pctra. l.l8 
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The discrepancy can be seen more clearly when the results are expressed both in 
number and in amount. Thus, it is found in France's report that the post-clearance checks 
represent only 3% of the total number of checks 18 and 18.7% of the number of 
irregularities detected, but 87% of the amount of the duties at issue. A similar finding 
emerges from Italy's report: post-clearance checks represent 18% of the total number of 
checks but 85% of the irregularities detected, expressed as an amount (€15.5 million out 
of a total of€18.1). 
In contrast, when the data relating to the results of the controls are provided by 
amount (e.g. Belgium, Germany), they are particularly difficult to interpret because of 
the exceptionally high value of certain cases which can significantly distort the figures. 
For example, Belgium's report shows an 18% increase in cases of own resources 
irregularities detected between 1994 and 1995 (from 5 502 to 6 507), while the amounts 
concerned almost doubled (from 40 to 74 million euros). 
The Commission, which studied the differences in losses of own resources 
between 1995 and 1996 by amount and presented them to the Advisory Committee·on 
Own Resources, gives the same explanation for the large differences between the two 
years, 19 highlighting the notable fraud cases which emerged during one or other year. The 
entry into force of Regulation No 2988/95, cited above, was also mentioned: it introduces 
a broader concept of irregularity. 
In the Dutch report, which shows an increase in the number of irregularities 
detected, the period 1993-95 shows a stable rate of detection, particularly marked for 
controls on release into free circulation. The rate of detection remains close to :25%, 
whatever the number of physical checks on import.:w Maintaining such detection levels 
shows the value of increasing controls at the Union's borders. 
The other comparison data requested by the Commission relating to the different 
types of customs arrangements (e.g. Community transit, inward processing, temporary 
admission etc.) were provided by too few Member States for a meaningful synthesis to be 
produced. 
1.4. Administrative penalties in own resources 
The final component of the comparative study related to administrative penalties. 
Until now there has been very little information on Member States' practice. The 
Commission and the Council therefore wanted to look at this subject in greater depth, 
while bearing in mind the diversity of the legal arrangements for the punishment of 
irregular behaviour, and the variety of Member States' administrative practices in a fteld 
IS 
19 
20 
The French repllrt "'"~ Ute comparable data, i.e. the 4 673 post-clearance checks and 150 852 
physical checks on import, without taking account of the 84-+ 320 defened checks, \\htch cun,t>t 
of verification of the papers (declarations and attached documents) after collectiOn of the good' hy 
specialised sections of the regiOnal customs dtrectorates. 
Working document No XIX/24329/98, Analysis of annual reports for 19Y6 suhmittcd /1\ thf' 
Member States wzder Article I 7( 3) of Regulation I 552189, pages 9-10. Document presentL·d tu the 
Advisory Committee on Own Resources on 8 July 1998. 
The total number of physical checks on imports cited by the Netherbnds i~ 139 232 m J99J. 
106 993 m 199-+, 116 011 in 199-+. The inegularities detected are growing in parallel I q 551 m 
1993, i.e. a rate of 2-+.8'7c; 26 958 in 1994, i.e. 25.2'7c; and 29 561 in 1995. i.e. 25.5'1 l 
For post-clearance checks, the detectton rate is 1-+71· in 1994 and 16.27c in 1995. 
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\\here there is no common kgislatton. As the Court of Auditors pomts out regarding the 
Community's mtemal VAT arrangements. "Differences benveen the national definitions 
of fraud and, therefore. between the penalties applied. ma_v wzdemzine their deterrent 
effect. Differences in the le~al and administrath·e frameworks are further risk factors 
that can be fraudulently exploited". 21 
The data provided by the Member States - more substantial than in the first phase 
of the study- can be summansed as follows. d1stmguishing penalties (as requested by the 
supplementary questionnaire) in accordance with the type of checks which led to them. 
The data are provided in the form of the number of irregularities and penalties imposed, 
and not in the form of value (except where the national contributions have taken a 
different approach). 
Table No 3: checks and administrative penalties, 1995 
Member irregularities detected admimstrati ve irregularities detected administrative 
States dunng 1mport checks penalties during post-clearance penalties 
checks 
B 3 019 - 2 917 -
DK - - - -
D - - - -
EL 11 050 €6.88m (1) - -
E - - - -
F 196!0(2) 8 085 4 511 (2) 1 847 
IRL 395 470 -
I 3 291 2 616 3 453 2 240 
L 12 12 154 -
NL 29 561 540 14 479 (3) 
A - - -
p 5 - 22 (4) -
FIN 6 500 - - €0.16m (5) 
s 29 136 335 6 390 843 
UK 11 033 303 (6) 
( l) Amount of tines imposed for cases of simple customs mfnngements, plus €51 million in fines 1m posed 
in the 1 047 cases of smuggling. 
(2) Th1s is an estimate, and the 24 121 irregularities detected can therefore be broken down as follows: 
18.71Jc of the irregularities found are in the field of own resources (themselves evaluated at 2/3 of the 
irregularities detected in commercial operations, i.e. 36 181 ). 
(3) The number of administrative fines provided is an overall figure, relatmg to the checks carried out on 
release into free circulation and post-clearance checks. 
(+)Includes only irregularities over €!0 000. 
(5) Finland's report states that the application of administrative penalties applied as a result of inspection 
operations has been curbed, as it is the first year of membership of the European Umon. 
(6) Overall figure for irregularities of over €610. whatever the type of check wh1ch led to their discovery. 
These 303 penalties represent €0.9 million. 
:'I Court of Aud1tors. Annual Report for 1997. para. 1.31; see also Annual Report for 1995, 
para 1.89 et seq 
The information provided in this table is not exhaustive. However. it can be seen 
that the application of administrative penalties in own resources, while not systematic, is 
not negligible. This is particularly true since several of the other Member States which do 
not give a result in figures apply administrative penalties without drawing up precise 
statistics (e.g. Portugal or Finland, regarding penalties imposed on the basis of physical 
checks). 
Ireland indicates that many cases of irregularities are settled out of court by a flat-
rate increase in the duties at issue, generally of around 125% of the own resources and 
other unpaid duties. 
More generally, having described several cases of own resources fraud, Germany 
states that almost all the cases that it mentions have been, or are, the subject of 
administrative or legal proceedings, because of the seriousness of the acts or the amounts 
at issue. 
Others, such as Belgium, point out that, as indicated in the first phase of the 
study, tbeir legal system has no system of administrative infringements with general 
scope; Austria says it does not normally impose administrative penalties (except in 
international travel), but rather criminal penalties which are imposed for tax 
infringements. 
As regards the Member States which have provided figures, France evaluates the 
amount of penalties corresponding to 9 932 infringements discovered in the field of own 
resources, essentially in the course of customs operations, at €9 million in 1995. 
However, this is an estimate and not a centralised figure, especially since the 
infringements may involve Community own resources and national resources, though it 
is not possible to specify what proportion of the fine actually relates to the own resources 
at issue. 
These data are provided once again for 1995, since too few reports provided 
findings over several years. No hypothesis can therefore be formulated on the basis of an 
increase in the administrative penalties found in the repons of the Netherlands22 and 
Sweden. 23 
This brief survey of the various national systems clearly reveals a meaningful 
system of penalties in certain Member States, but serious questions remain on the 
equivalence of administrative penalties across the Community. A rather marked diversity 
of situations is becoming established between Member States which explicitly exclude 
recourse to administrative penalties, those which apply them, but at very variable levels 
and frequencies, and those which have not provided data on the matter (which leads to 
the assumption, in the absence of clear indications to the contrary, that administrative 
penalties do not play a key role in their system of national measures to protect the 
Community's own resources). 
Administrative fines in own resources in the Netherlands: 10 223m 1993, then 11 349 in 1994, 
and 14 479 in 1995. The rate of punishment of the irregularities d1~covered rose from 31 to 537c 
between 1993 and 1995. 
In Sweden, the number and value of notices to pay an add1t10nal amount trebled between 1995. 
the first year of membership. and the following year (1996 J· 1 178 notices (€ 172 000) in 1995; 
3 063 notices (€6'25 000) in 1996. 
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This d1sparity would seem unconducive to the consolidation of an equivalent 
protection of Community finances and probably requires an alignment of practices in the 
area of administrative customs penalties. The implementation of the provisions on 
administrative customs penalties, adopted since then within the framework of the action 
programme for customs in the Community (Customs 2002), should contribute to this in 
"4 the future.-
1.5. Conclusion on own resources 
This is a sensitive area where the Member States, following the imp~ementation 
of the single market. have generally stepped up checks or reqeployed their inspection 
activities to improve the performance of the services concerned. As ~ result, the number 
of irregularities discovered has increased. The closer cooperation specified in Article 280 
(ex-Article 209a) of the EC Treaty and implemented with the help of th~ Commission is 
an essential tool against own resources fraud, especially since remedies are currently 
applied in an uncoordinated fashion. 
The Commission's conclusion from this is that the development of cooperation with the 
Member States and the targeting of anti-fraud activities on sectors at risk must be 
continued. Harmonisation of administrative customs penalties, which has been coming 
up against legal and political problems for a number of years, should be the logical next 
step after this attempt at aligning practices in inspection and the fight against fraud and 
irregularities. In view of the strongly national character of law enforcement legislation, 
harmonisation between the Member States can only be achieved in practice through an 
overall approach to all financial penalties. 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the criteria set by the new 
Article 280 require more for the protection of Community finances than simple 
assimilation with the measures taken to protect national finances: from an objective as to 
the means to be deployed (implementing the same measures to combat national and 
Community fraud), we move to an objective as to the result to be attained- effective, 
equivalent protection based on dissuasive measures to combat fraud. 
To the extent that the Member States have taken the trouble to notify significant 
data, and vvith reference to the only year considered (1995), the information given above 
does not show an abnormally low control rate, but does show considerable divergence 
between Member States. The Commission tnerefore considers that there is insufficient 
proof of the eqmvalence of checks. even if progress has since been made by the Member 
States in sending information, 25 pursuant to Commission Decision No 97/245 of 
20 March 1997.26 ._In order to measure this equivalence, the different types of checks 
car-ried out in the Member States need to be more closely defined. 
25 
26 
Decision No 210/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 
adopting an action programme for customs m the Community (Customs 2000 ). Article 13. 
Summary report on the Lonunu:•:,·cltion~ by Member States on their mspection actiYlties and 
findmgs and quest10ns of pnnClple in the field of traditional own resources - 1997 -- Article 17 ( 3) 
of Council RegulatiOn (EEC. Euratom) No 1552/89). COM(1999) 110 final. pp.13-14. 
Doc C(97) 800 final 
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The rate of detection of irregularities is much more variable and difficult to 
analyse. However, the information provided seems to indicate greater overall efficiency 
than in checks on expenditure. 
In terms of penalties, however, too few contributions show a clear dissuasive use 
of administrative penalties. The Member States follow policies of dissuasion which are 
based on their own institutional considerations and legal traditions, and which are not 
coordinated and are moving away from the aim of equivalence. The new provisions of 
Article 280(5) of the EC Treaty offer the possibility of monitoring year on year the 
checks carried out and evaluating their results in terms of protection of the Community's 
financial interests. 
2. STRUCTURAL EXPENDITURE 
2.1. Initial data 
Qn structural expenditure (Structural Funds: ERDF, ESF, EAGGF Guidance 
Section, Cohesion Fund, Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance), it became clear in 
the course of the first stage of the comparative analysis that further information was 
urgently needed, since insufficient statistical data was available regarding the checks carried 
out. The Commission made the following assessment regarding expenditure, largely on the 
basis of the descriptions of how the services were organised: 
"The protection given to Community interests is less satisfactory than the protection 
given to revenue. The organisation of controls is often the responsibility of the fund 
administrators themselves .... The verification of accounts and checks on compliance with 
fomzal requirements are more common than on-the-spot checks by experts, particularly in 
the case of the Stntctural Funds. "27 
It is therefore particularly important, on the basis of the new data submitted as 
additional information by the Member States, to define checks on the Structural Funds, 
since the data centralised by the Commission in the last few years is insufficient to permit 
easy identification of a reliable trend in anti-fraud activity in this area. In its annual report,28 
the Commission pointed out that the setting up in 1996 by the Member States of detailed 
procedures for the communication of frauds and irregularities resulted in a significant 
increase in the number of cases in comparison with 1995. There was also a four-fold 
increase in the amounts involved. This statistical effect, which inflated the result for 1996, 
was repeated, in reverse this time, in 1997, when the amounts concerned were halved. 29 
As with own resources, we shall take as our starting point the information provided 
during the first stage of the analysis before moving on to examine the checks carried out, the 
irregularities detected and the administrative penalties imposed on the basis of the latest 
national reports. 
28 
29 
Comparative Analysis, pages 39 and 40. 
The fight against fraud: Annual Report ( 1996), page 7. 
The fight against fraud: Annual Report ( 1997), page 68. 
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The first stage of the analysis brought together a few fairly sparse details on the 
checks carried out; administrative penalties were not discussed. Most national reports took 
great care over the descnption of the administrative contro 1 system. 30 By definition, the 
Structural Funds involve a wide range of inspection bodies and types of inspection, 
dependmg on the methods used (departmental audits or inspection of projects and 
operations), the role played by local and regional authorities and bodies \Vith local 
responsibility for inspections. the place of external inspections entrusted to organisations 
\Vith general responsibihties along the lines of a court of auditors or financial inspectorate, 
or the stage in the project at which the checks are carried out (selection, implementation, 
completion). 
Nevertheless, it was possible to use the quantitative information provided by some 
Member States in drawing up the additional questionnaire. 
This was particularly true of Spain, which in its first report included inspection 
plans and irregularities detected, by Fund (and by category of expenditure, making it 
possible to analyse some fields in greater detail). Between 1993 and 1994, the report note-d a 
marked ~ncrease in the amounts checked and for a similar number of cases found a sharp 
rise in the results of irregularities. In the case of the ERDF,3 I the sharp increase in the sums 
involved could be attributed to a number of cases recorded under the heading "local 
authorities" and representing €8 million. or two thirds of the total accounted for by the 
irregularities. Within the ESF there was a sharp rise in the number of checks and 
irregularities, particularly in relation to employment measures. 32 Finally, in the EAGGF 
Guidance Section, the increase in checks and irregularities detected33 related to "marketing" 
and "agricultural structures", while a very sharp (six-fold) rise in inspections in the field of 
compensatory allowances led to the detection of only a small number of irregularities. 
The link between checks and irregularities was also clear in the report from 
Portugal. The number of projects mspected for the two reference years of 1993 and 1994 
fell, as did the number of irregularities detected,3-+ as a result of the development of a system 
audit which could be used to evaluate complete systems incorporating dozens of measures, 
as well as individual projects. 
Two other Member States provided a number of isolated details: as regards the 
EAGGF Guidance Section, France mentioned the number of annual inspections concerning 
compensatory allowances (approximately 15 000 a year) and the control rate for the 
material improvement plans (3% a year); for the ESF, the number of bodies to be inspected 
in 1995 was to increase, bringing it closer to the target figure of 100. On the matter of 
30 
31 
32 
34 
Cf. the study presented m 1995. Comparatn·e anal_vsis. pages 24 to 36. 
1993: 74 ERDF control operations (total sum involved €82.64 million). leading to the detection of 18 
irregularities (sums involved €1.9 million). 
1994: 70 control operations (total sum involved €198 million). leading to the detection of 17 
irregularities (sums involved €11.7 million). 
1993: 156 ESF control operat10ns (total sum mvolved €100.7 m!lhon). leadmg to the detection of 80 
megulanties (sums involved €6 55 milhon). 
1994: 127 control operations (total €226 million) I 67 irregularities (€14.9 million). 
EAGGF-Guidance and Fishenes: the amounts checked rose from €12.1 milliOn (1993) to €30 
million (1994). and irregularities detected rose from € 0.5 to 2.8 milhon (199-+J. 
ERDF, ESF and EAGGF-Guidance Section: 5887 controls in 1993. follm\ed by 4733 in 1994. 
Irregularities detected (recorded before the entry into force of Regulation 1681194 ): € 1.6 million in 
1993. €1 million in 1994. 
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results, the French report noted the substantial recovery payments under the ESF (26 million 
euros in 1993 and 33 million euros in 1994), but did not identify the Community share 
separately. 
Lastly, the United Kingdom gave a number of details about ESF controls (76 
organisations visited in 1993/94 and 106 in 1994/95, with a target of 150 a year, which 
would represent an inspection rate of 10% of all bodies applying for funds). 
The above examples show that it is possible to evaluate the controls carried out and 
the results obtained with a view to shedding light on the findings set out in the reports from 
the Member States, which can be difficult to interpret, in view of the recent establishment of 
an overall communication system. 
The establishment of a direct link between checks (principally those external to the 
organisation which requests and pays for them) and the detection of irregularities was worth 
studying in greater depth. Similarly, a study of the application of administrative penalties 
also seemed appropriate, given the shortage of information in this area. 
The information requested by the Commission in its additional questionnaire was 
therefore intended to provide it with an overview of the situation as regards Structural Fund 
controls and enable it to make a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of the various 
national systems. It had also led to the adoption of Regulation No 2064/97 of 
15 October 1997 on the financial control by Member States of operations co-financed by 
the Structural Funds, which provides for a minimum inspection rate for the Funds as a 
whole, and the concentration of the checks on a representative sample of the programmes 
2.2. Checks on structural expenditure 
The concept of inspection applied by the Member States was, logically enough, 
that of external auditing, excluding checks inherent in the processing of cases and the 
payment of the aid. The reference period is still 1995, and the following table sets out the 
gist of the information provided on the checks carried out and the resulting inspection 
rate, in terms of both the number of checks and the sums involved. 
. . ./ ... 
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Member 
States 
B 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
Table 4 : controls carried out into Structural Fund measures, 1995 
Controls earned out: number I value Inspection rate: number I value 
(l) 
_E_EJ)__E:__U -~Qiltf_Ql~ L~_Lm_______________________ _ ____________ _1 CJcL8__CZc_ __ ~-----
ESF: 181 controls 1€15.1 m 34% I 41 o/c ==~~--=~~~~~~~-~=~~=---------------------4----------c~~-~~~.-~c~~'---------------
EAGGF-Guidance - 8 - 11 % 
ESF: 25% (2) 
-----------------------------------~---~ -------~---------------
EAGGF-Guidance: 27 729 controls 1€ 115 m (3) -
- (5) 
ESF: 1 body in 10 (1995) I control covering €32.5 m 
( 1993196) 
10 Cf'c (number) 
IRL _E_EDE:..A.2_~9_1ltmlV_~_2.8:L!Il ____ ---~------- ---~--~---=------------------
_c;QQ~.§l.9B_fullg~J-~.9ntr:.()l~f~ 1.3 11l. ____________ -----~-------=---~------
_ESf~_'!ls_~!!:<?l~l~§J_Ql_{~l 12 Cfc I 34 o/c 
EAGGF-Guidance (7) 27% - 100% (number) 
L EAGGF-Guidance: 817 controls I >€3.3 m 12.9% 
NL _(.~_E_EDE:_l_34 CQ[]![QbLUl_<Un____ __ ~--- 69 %I 74 % --
A 
p 
FIN 
i2_LES_f.:_jQ_£_Ql}![Qh;}_fa.S_m _______ ~----- ________ _6.8_J o/c ( 'v'.gl_!JsD___ ______ _ 
(10) EAGGF-Guidance: 375 controls 1€6.9 m 40% I 67% 
-~_RD __F __ :_3 __ c_o_n __ tr_o __ ls __ w_i_t_h_E_U __ (~_1_9_9_6)~----------------+-----------------------­
EAGGF-Guid:mce: 6998 controls (compensatory 
All Funds: 4 553 controls 24% I 58% 
FIFG: 35 controls 66 o/c 
S FIFG: 143 controls /€ 7.9 m (1996) 48% I 92% 
·------------------------------~------ ---· 
EAGGF-Guidance: 2 576 controls (compensatory 11.1 CJc (number) 
UK ~~f~_]_~~-~.9_1}~()1~-----------------------~-- _______ lQ_57~~~m~~----~-
ESF: 61 controls -
(1) Belgium states only that this is a matter for the language Communities and the Regions. 
(2) As Germany did not provide a standardised summary of data from the Lander, this figure is an estimate 
based on the statistics provided. 
(3) Checks carried out on compensatory allowances (approximately a fifth of agricultural expenditure on 
guidance) carried out on the spot or using remote sensing, as part of the integrated administration and 
control system -area (lACS-area). in 1995. 
(~) Greece listed reports of irregularities on the basis of Regulation 1681194, without hoking them to 
controls. 
(5) Spain provided data for 1993 and 1994 (analysed below), but not for 1995. 
( 6) Data for October 95-September 1996. 
(7) In its very comprehensive reply. Ireland submitted a series of ten tables. which cannot be reproduced 
here, indicating a high level of controls. ranging from 27% (per capita aid) to 100% (systematic checks). 
(8) For this entire ERDF heading. the data cover all the Dutch regions concerned. with the exception of 
South Limburg and Twente. 
(9) The figures for this ESF headmg cover the period 1994-1997. 
(10) The figures for this EAGGF. Guidance Section, heading cover the period 1993-1995. 
NB: most of the questions did not apply to Austria. Finland and Sweden, as 1995 was the year in which the 
Structural Funds were established in these countries following accession. 
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The disparities which emerge on studying this table are largely the result of 
differences in the way control of the Structural Funds is organised. It is a statistical 
representation of features specific to the various national administrations, already 
referred to in the first stage of the analysis. 35 In the absence of Community rules which 
would oblige the Member States to keep exactly the statistics asked for, the data supplied 
are patchy, do not relate to all the Funds or reference periods, or are provided by district 
with no national summary, which makes comparisons between the 15 Member States 
difficult. Particularly regrettable is the lack of information from the four Member States 
which in 1995 received over 50% of the funds allocated for structural measures. 
Some reports nevertheless provided information that could be compared over 
more than one year. For example, the Danish report mentions a stepping-up of physical 
checks of ERDF projects between 1993 and 1995 (checks covering a value of 2 million 
euros instead of 0.8 euros, equivalent to an increase in inspection rate from 3% to 8% ). 
France refers to an increase in controls in connection with the ESF measured either by 
the number of days needed for the checks (up 58% between 1995 and 1996) or by the 
number of controls initiated (66 in 1995 and 96 in the following year). Ireland gives 
figures covering several years which show that inspection rates are stable at a very high 
level (90% - 100%) but which include on-the-spot checks and checks on documents 
relating to projects by the departments responsible for carrying them out. The Dutch 
report refines this presentation, making a distinction, in the case of the ERDF, between 
admmistrative checks, for which the inspection rate is dose to 100%, and physical 
inspections of projects, which cover three-quarters of the amounts concerned and a total 
of 134 projects in 1995 (compared with 60 in 1994). 
Finally, the Spanish report includes a large number of tables from which it is 
possible to evaluate the increase in the number of checks carried out between 1993 and 
1994, as already referred to in the first part of the comparative study. The implementation 
of the national inspection plans, principally in the area of the ESF, is compared with the 
original targets, with a high implementation rate in the training sector (target achieved in 
1993 and exceeded in 1994 with the completion of a large system audit relating to half 
total expenditure), and more modest achievements in the employment sector (four-fifths 
of target achieved in 1993 and three-fifths in 1994). The number of inspections carried 
out rose in 1994. 
The information collected therefore g~nerally indicates an increase in activity in 
controlling the Structural Funds. In the absence of a Community framework prior to the 
introduction of Regulation 2064/97, however, the Member States were free to set 
national standards or to leave the task of deciding on the checks to be carried out to local 
officials. The European Court of Auditors often raises the question of insufficient checks 
on structural expenditure, however. 36 Many question-marks remain and only a few of the 
reports include, as the Commission would have liked, data relating to the audit of all the 
Structural Funds, accompanied by essential methodological details on the nature of the 
controls carried out and the organisation responsible for them. 
35 
36 
Comparative muzlysis, p. 31-32 and table p. 33-34. 
Cf.: Court of Audttors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 1995. § 4.83, 4.84, 6.59, 
6.62, 6.65, 6.67 and 6.69 ; Annual Report concerning the financial _'>'ear 1996. § 6.20. 6.39, 7.49, 
8.71 and 9.38 ; Annual Report concerning the financial year 1997, § 3.39 and 3 -H. 
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2.3. Irregularities detected in the Structural Funds 
Set out below are the earlier data on controls (in terms of number and value), plus 
the number of irregularities detected in the course of these checks. Where possible, a 
detection rate for irregularities has been calculated. 
. . ./ ... 
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Table 5 : controls carried out and irregularities detected, Structural Fund measures, 1995 
Member 
States 
B 
DK 
Controls earned out: number I value 
EliD f_:_l_l_~QD_tr.9_ls_!_ _€2_m_~-_____________ _ 
ESF: 181 controls I €15.1 m 
Irregularities detected 
0 
0 
EAGGF-Guidance. - 52 cases I €88 000 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
L 
NL 
ESF:-
EAGGF-Guidance: 27 729 controls I €115 m 
- (4) 
ESF: 1 body inlO (1995) I control covering € 325m 
(199 311996) 
- ERQF_:32. ~QDJrpJ :;,_L -~2_a-Lm___________ ___ ____ __ ______ _ 
Cohesion Fund· 5 controls I €21.3 m 
-~- ----- ---------------------------------------------- -----------
ESF: 41 controls I €6.2 m 
EAGGF-Guidance: -
EAGGF-GUJdance: 817 controls I> €3.3 m 
_E:RQf_:_]J_4_~p_n_tr_Ql~L~lH:i m -----------------·-_______ _ 
_I:_$f_:_)_Q_~Ql1 trQl_s_LUJ,_a_IIL _________________________ _ 
EAGGF-Guidance: 375 controls I € 6.9 m 
~(1) 
14610(2) 
(3) 
€5.2m(5) 
€3.9m 
0 
0 
737 
17 (6) 
0 
17 cases/€68 000 
r:lte 
____ Q ____ _ 
0 
52.7% 
16 ';t 
lA% 
-----------
0 
0 
_ __ .Q_(}~---
_ ___ :J.~ L_ __ 
1 9c (9) 
A ERDF: 3 controls with the EU (1996) 0 0 
---------~---------~---------~------------- ----
EAGGF-Guidance: 6998 controls (compensatorv 564 8 % 
P All Funds: 4 553 controls 44 (cases< €4000) -
FIN FIFG: 35 controls 
s FIFG: 143 controlsl€7.9 m (96) 
UK ERDF: 782 controls 4 0.5 'lc 
ESF: 61 controls 3 cases I €1.5 m 
(I) Germany d1d not provide a standardised summary of data from the Linder. The number of irregularities 
reported per Land IS not signiticant (4 in Rhineland-Westphalia, 1 in Saxony). 
(2) Checks earned out on compensatory allowances (approximately a tifth of agricultural expenditure on 
guidance) carried out on the spot or usmg remote sensing. as part of the mtegrated administration and 
control system - area (lACS-area), m 1995. Cf. the considerably smaller number of cases reported by 
Germany for all structural measures, i.e. 21 cases in 1995. 
(3) Greece listed reports of irregularities on the basis of Regulation 1681194. wtthout lmking them to 
controls. 
(+)Spain provided data for 1993 and 1994 (analysed belovv). but not for 1995. 
(5) Data for October 95-September 1996. 
(6l Italy quotes references to 17 cases of megulanties reported in relation to 1995 (12 in the ESF, 4 in the 
ERDF. 1 in the EAGGF Gutdance Sectton) 
( 7 l Fur th1s entire ERDF headmg the data cover all the Dutch regions concerned. with the exceptton of 
South Ltmburg and Twente. 
(8) The figures for this ESF heading cover the period 1994-1997. 
(9) The figures for this EAGGF, Guidance SectiOn, headmg cover the period 1993-1995. 
NB: most of the questions did not apply to Austria. Finland and Sweden ( 1995 was the year in which the 
Structural Funds were established in these countries following accession). 
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This table reveals an even more disappointing level of knowledge of the findings 
of the inspections carried out into the Structural Funds. The findings listed here are 
confined to a few dozen cases, presented by some Member States only. The connection 
between checks and the detection of irregularities is seldom made. The Member States 
usually confine themselves to providing the information which has been made 
compulsory by Community legislation introduced in the meantime. 37 It should be noted, 
moreover, that not all countries comply with these provisions, some Member States 
notifying the European Commission only of minor fraud cases. 38 Nor do the figures 
reported in accordance with the legislation always correspond to those provided for the 
purposes of this enquiry. This raises doubts as to the reliability of some of these figures. 
Although an assessment is sometimes made of the effectiveness of the structural 
programmes, there is no methodical evaluation of the checks carried out. Only the 
Spanish report shows any interest in evaluating inspections carried out between 1993 and 
1994, as already mentioned in the first stage of the comparative analysis. In addition to 
the implementation of the national audit plans, referred to above, a comparison of the 
checks carried out and irregularities detected shows that in 1994, when Structural Ftind 
inspectiems were stepped up, the irregularities detected increased substantially, either in 
number and in value alike (ESF,39 EAGGF-Guidance' Section and FIFG"w), or only in 
value (ERDF). 41 
Unfortunately, the information available is far too incomplete to allow a more 
accurate assessment. The national reports still fall far short of the original aim of a 
multiannual evaluation, in terms both of number and value, of the checks carried out and 
the irregularities detected. 
2.4. Administrative penalties in the field of structural expenditure 
The first point to bear in mind is that the reference period (1995) pre-dates the 
entry into force of the "protection of financial interests" Regulation (No 2988/95), which 
lays down horizontal rules for administrative penalties under Community law. 
The national reports which dealt with administrative penalties in the context of 
the Structural Funds usually included under this heading requests for reimbursement, 
described merely as "measures" by the above Regulation. ·t2 The Commission has 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Regulation (ECJ No 1681194. 
Court of Auditors, Special Report n°.f./95 of 22 December 1995, § 10.11. 
ESF : the mspection rate (in terms of value) increased from 22o/c to 3Y7c bet\\een 1993 and 1994; 
the number of irregularities detected mcreased five-fold and represented a sharp increase in value 
(from €40 million to € 70.4 million). 
EAGGF Guidance Section and fisheries: the inspection rate (in terms of value) increased from 3% 
to 11% ; the number of irregularities detected increased four-fold and tnpled in value (from €0.9 
to € 2.8 million). 
ERDF: the inspection rate (in terms of value) increased from 141Jc to 40Slc between 1993 and 
1994; the number of irregularities detected remained stable but the amounts concerned were eight 
times greater (€2 million in 1993. € 17 million in 1994 ). 
Article 4(1) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the 
protection of the European Communities' financial interests states: "As a general rule. any 
irregularity shall involve withdrawal of the \\Tongly obtained advantage by an obligation to pay or 
repay the amounts due or \VTOngly received ... "and Article 4(4) : "The measures provided for in 
this Article shall not be regarded as penalties." 
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therefore omitted such information; the remaining contnbutions from the Member States 
are summarised in the table below. 
Table 6 : Administrative penalties in the field of structural expenditure 
Member Irregularities detected Administrative penalties applied 
States 
B - -
DK _EJID..£~0~--------~-~- -
ESF: 0 -
·---
EAGGF-Guidance: 52 casesl€88 000 f18 requests for reimbursement (conversion aid)]* 
D ESF:- [432 requests for reimbursement (Thuringia)]* 
EL - -
E (1) ERDF: 21 cases I €17 m 19 cases I €14.7 m 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ESF: 90 cases I €40.2 m 21 cases I € 1 m 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
EAGGF-Guidance. FIFG; 89 cases. €2.9 rr 52 cases l€0.14m 
F ESF:- amount< € 5.2 m (2) 
IRL _1:_~~~~3~2_01 __________________________ -
-~Qh~~j_9_!!_f.!ll!~t_Q _______________________ -
ESF: 0 -
-----------------------------------------------
EAGGF- Guidance: 737 cases -
I - -
L EAGGF-Guidance: - 12 penalties relating to compensatory allowances 
NL _{:_~~~12------------------------------- Q 
ESF:- -
------------------------------------------
EAGGF- Guidance: - f 17 oroiects 2:ivina rise to reimbursements I €68 000 1* 
A ERDF: 0 0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EAGGF-Guidance: 564 (compensatory allowances) 
p All funds: 44 cases (only cases< €4000) ---------~~f __ ~.l ~..R~9_l_l_i_~!~!9Q~_f()i_~0~_f()J.!2~!~g _ _y~~~-L~~f~:~_~~!? ________ 
EAGGF-Guidance : 177 terminations of contract 
FIN EAGGF-Guidance· - 863 financial penalties relating to compensatory allowances 
s - -
UK ~~f~-~-~~-~~~-------L--------------------- [1 request for repayment]* 
ESF: 3 cases I €1.5 m -
( 1) Data for 1994. 
(2) For the entire period 1993-1996. France states that the final amount is less than this tigure of €5.2 
million. which corresponds to the proposals for rectification drawn up by the authority responsible for 
inspection. 
(*) As with reduction, suspension and cancellation of assistance (Article 24 of Regulation (EEC) 
n° 4253188). the obligation to repay sums received unduly is not regarded as a penalty within the meaning 
of Article 4 of Regulation (EC. Euratom) No 2988195. 
This table illustrates the difficulty of obtaining an overall picture of the 
administrative penalties applied in the field of structural expenditure. Some national 
reports refer to several dozen penalties imposed in connection with one or other of the 
Structural Funds. If a summary document were produced covering the information 
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requested by the Commission, and relating only to the first part of the question (for the 
reference period, "for each Fund," point 2.2 of the additional questionnaire: 
administrative penalties actually applied, number of cases in which penalties were 
app!Jed), it would be nine-tenths empty and there would be virtually no multi-annual 
data. 
Here, as elsewhere, several Member States refer to the administrative cost of 
gathering this data. This argument is perfectly understandable, even though it must be 
seen in relation to the clear political requirement imposed as a result of the request from 
the Council (Economic and Financial Affairs) for a reliable comparative analysis on the 
questiOn of administrative penalties. 
The Commission's operation has shown that, with one or two exceptions, the 
national authorities do not possess all the information on irregularities detected as a result 
of checks and still less on administrative penalties actually applied. Knowledge of the 
conditions for implementing the sequence "checks carried out/irregularities 
detected/penalties imposed" is only very patchy compared with the information gathered 
in connection with own resources, in particular. 
2.5. Conclusions concerning the Structural Funds 
In the absence of Community rules on checks and penalties in the field of 
structural expenditure prior to 1997,43 it was rare for a Member State to introduce binding 
subsidiary rules on numerical inspection targets. Irregularities are not listed over and 
above the obligation imposed by Community legislation relating to the most serious 
cases. Finally, there is almost no monitoring of the application of administrative 
penalties. 
A legislative initiative on the part of the Commission was needed in this context 
to ensure an equivalent level of protection of Community finances based on deterrent 
measures to combat fraud, in accordance with the objectives laid down by the Madrid 
European Council of December 1995 and subsequently confirmed in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 of 15 October 1997 on the financial 
control by Member States of operations co-financed by the Structural Funds stipulates 
that checks must cover at least 5% of the total eligible expenditure. It should make it 
possible for the Commission to ensure that Member States' inspection systems are set up 
in a uniform way. The transmission by the Member States of their annual report on the 
application of this Regulation, as required by Article 9, is not sufficiently regulated. The 
information obtained is often difficult to use. A major effort must now be made to apply 
these provisions. 
Finally, the question of the absence of a Community framework for 
administrative penalties is still unresolved. 
43 With the exception of framework Regulation (EC) 2988/95, which deals with administrative 
penalties in Community law. 
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3. EAGGF GUARANTEE SECTION 
3.1. Initial data 
The Commission has intentionally simplified the comparative analysis as regards 
farm spending under the EAGGF Guarantee Section. As many Member States have 
pointed out, there was no need to repeat the information relating to checks earned out 
and irregularities detected when this topic is already more than adequately covered by 
Community legislation (rules on checks and the obligation to report irregularities 
involving sums of more than €4 000). 
Still relevant, on the other hand, was the section of the additional questionnaire 
dealing with the application of administrative penalties in the area of agricultural 
expenditure, to which the comment made in 1995 in the section dealing with 
administrative penalties was still entirely applicable, i.e. as a whole the Member States 
did not reply to the question on national and Community administrative penalties, which 
authorities could impose such penalties or the number of cases.44 The Commission wrote 
inl995:. 
"According to the reports, the national authorities make effective use of 
Community CAP penalties, designed to ensure that the system of subsidies and 
intervention measures is implemented in strict accordance lvith the ntles and in a 
unifonn manner. Hmvever, with the exception of a few pieces of infonnation ... on 
Community penalties in connection with the integrated management system, there were 
no statistics showing how widely Community administrative penalties were used in 
practice". 
Only the Danish and French reports mentioned penalties actually applied, citing 
several hundred cases in which administrative penalties were imposed for the most 
serious irregularities. 45 
3.2. Analysis of administrative penalties in the EAGGF Guarantee Section 
The data collected in the course of the second stage of the survey are more 
extensive and allow a much better approach to the question of administrative penalties in 
the agricultural sector. 
Unfortunately, in some cases certain Member States only mentioned the checks 
carried out. Thus, in the case of the ex post checks carried out on the basis of Regulation 
No 4045/89, some Member States gave total amounts without specifying the penalties 
imposed in respect of the irregularities detected on this basis. The Commission's request 
was quite different and related principally to all national or Community administrative 
~5 
Comparative annlysis, p. 55. 
Denmark indicated in the integrated control system 341 cases in which aid was withdrawn and 
647 cases in which it was reduced, and national penalties in the form of a fine in 6 cases (1993 
figures); in the field of export refunds 22 fines were imposed in accordance with national 
legislation. 
France gave the following figures in connection with the lACS: a penalty rate of 25% in aid to 
arable crops (52 000 checks, 13 000 penalties, of which one tenth (1 300) exceeded the threshold 
for total withdrawal of aid, namely 2.5% ), and a rate of 4% in livestock premiums. of which 1% 
led to total withdrawal of aid. 
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penalties imposed for the reference period (1993-1995), which should have been broken 
down according to the nature of the checks which had led to the imposition of the 
penalties. 
Certainly, this study apart, Regulation 595/91 requires the Member States to 
communicate to the Commission irregularities relating to sums of more than €4000 and 
action taken on them.46 However, this requirement was not complied with during the 
reference period of the analysis. The information in question was not sent to the 
Commission. 
The table below sets out the principal data provided by the Member States as part 
of this analysis, and is confined, as we have seen. to the information relating to penalties, 
without reference to the statistics which are concerned only with the checks carried out. 
46 Council Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 of 4 March 1991 concerning irregularities and the recovery 
of sums wrongly paid in connection with the financing of the common agricultural policy and the 
organization of an information system in this field and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 283172, 
Articles 3, 5 and 12. 
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Table 7 :Administrative penalties in the EAGGF-Guarantee Section, 1995 
Member Area concerned I legal bases for Administrative penalties applied 
States checks 
B - - (1) 
DK lACS-area, R 3508/92 988 (2) 
D J6_c:'_~::~_e_a:_].l_n_9_02!1_t.!:s:>kn1 ________ 1-1- 610 (penalty rate 52Ylc) 
Export refunds, R 3665/87 128 ( 4) 
EL _C<2!_~~nj~if2?_!!1_arke~Lf!g_y_e_'!r_) ~---- 12 producers fined a totalof€58 305 
Olive oil 8 (5) 
E - -
F lACS-area: 52 000 controls 13 000 penalties imposed. of which 1 300 withdrawals 
IRL IA CS-U-':'~§lCKkJ2tQQ_l!C:!i_Qn_ _________ 265 (6) 
I EAGGF-Guarantee as a whole 1 115 cases totallmg € 49.5 m (7) 
L 
__ 1~<=-S~ary_~----------~--------------- 78 (8) 
IACS-livestock_production 186 (8) 
NL _6ll2j_I1_~ectj_9_n~_(~tl 0 310 ________ 23 rep()rts 
_.PE24_l!i5-~ch~p-~·_a~E_~_!t_~al pro<!~~-~--
-------
128 cases, amount€647 790 
.P_I"_osi_l!i5-J_s~_h_~p-~li~_e~!~Is._!:!!~~~g_~'__ 133 cases, amount: €63 642 
produktschap "milk products" 326 cases, amount: €188 120 
A lACS-area 676 cases 
lACS-livestock production 1 493 cases 
p EAGGF-Guarantee as a whole 757 Q_enalties (10) 
FIN lACS-area 2 244 
lACS-livestock prod (sheep and 1 153 
Rural environment (R 2078/92) 235 
s lACS-area: 7493 controls 1 137 (penalty rate 15.2 '7c) r---- -------------------------------------
IAC.~::!L~~_s~~-~2!:~~~!l.9_1!:_±_8}9 ____ 507 (penalty rate 10.5 %) 
UK lACS (R 3508/92 and 2887/92) 1156(11) 
------- -------------------------------------
Other (Intervention Board) 12 fines, amount € 88 232 
( l) Belgium mentions the B.I.R.B .. the EAGGF Guarantee Section payment agency responsible for 
imposing the fines referred to in Article 11 of R 3665/&7, without specifying the penalties imposed. 
(2) Figure for 1993. already mentioned above: Denmark does not provide any additional data, pointing out 
that there are no records from which a systematic list of penalties can be drawn up. 
(3) Checks carried out on the spot and by remote sensing, relating to 413 161 applications. 
(~)Based on information from the central anti-fraud unit of the main customs office at Hamburg-Jonas. 
(5) E1ght food processing plants penalised by reduction in aid. The Greek report states that all food 
processing plants and 37% of oil mills were inspected for the 1994/95 marketing year. 
(6) Exclusion from premiums for diary cows, beef and veal, ewes. Most penalties added together in this 
way relate to irregularities totalling less than € 4 000. 
(7) Italy also quotes the number of cases closed without an injunction : closure (archiviazoni) in 329 cases 
representing a total of €38.3-1- million. 
(8) Luxembourg lists the penalties imposed following administrative or on-the-spot checks and relates them 
to the total number of applications : 11 penalties imposed following administrative checks and 67 
following on-the-spot checks on arable crops, for a total of 2182 applications (3.6 % of applications) ; in 
the case of stock-rearing this rate is as high as 5% : 186 penalties (incl. 101 following administrative 
checks and 85 following on-the-spot checks) for a total of 3718 applications. 
(9) Checks carried out by the Mmistry of Agriculture general inspectorate (AID) into levies and refunds, 
operatwns and aid schemes. 
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(10! Portugal confirms that these are penalties withm the meaning of Regulation 2988/95. This figure 
should be compared with the 31 698 checks carried out (penalty rate of 4 1llc) rather than the 374 
irregularities mentioned in Portugal's report. stating that they referred only to cases involving more than 
€4 000. Most of the 757 penalt1es (661 cases) involved exclusion from the aid scheme for one marketing 
year 
( 11) Compared with a total of 77 786 cases. making a penalty/applications rate of 1.57c, includmg 826 
reduction~ for makmg false statements of between 3llc and 207c. and 136 withdrawals of aid for making 
false statements of more than 20%. 
Most administrative penalties are imposed by the Member States in the context of 
the integrated administration and control system (lACS). The existence in Community 
legislation of obligations in relation to the carrying out of checks, the listing of 
irregularities according to their seriousness, reporting of the most serious irregularities, 
and the resulting application of penalties, leads to a more or less uniform system for the 
detection and penalising of irregularities. Where Member States have not supplied 
information under this heading questions arise as to whether administrative penalties are 
properly applied in the agricultural sector and hence whether Community finances are 
uniformly protected. 
In the other areas of the EAGGF Guarantee Section, few relevant details were 
provided which could be used to follow the application of administrative penalties by the 
Member States. Only the Netherlands quotes expenditure on such operations, and the 
number of penalties imposed run to several dozen. 47 The reports from Italy and Portugal, 
which give an overall figure for the whole of the EAGGF Guarantee Section, do not 
specify the place of administrative penalties outside the lACS. As for the administrative 
penalties in the agricultural customs field, these are rarely mentioned with the exception 
of the reports from Denmark, Sweden48 and the Netherlands. 
3.3. Conclusion concerning the EAGGF, Guarantee Section 
The general point to emerge from the study of administrative penalties in 
connection with the EAGGF, Guarantee Section, is the difference actually within the 
agricultural guarantee expenditure: the information available on the penalties imposed 
reveals a discrepancy between direct aid, on the one hand, and intervention, on the other. 
Obviously, this reinforces the impression that the application of administrative penalties 
in the different areas of the Community budget depends very much on the way in which 
they are integrated into the actual administration of expenditure, and into the inspection 
policy of the Member States. 
Thus, direct aid to farmers provides an example of the fairly consistent and 
uniform monitoring within the Union of the sequence controls/detection of 
irregularities/application of administrative penalties. Where the Community legislation is 
less binding, on the other hand, the Member States occasionally lose sight somewhat of 
the action taken on the checks laid down by the various regulations. Some are unable to 
provide even a brief description of the administrative penalties applied and, apart from 
47 
48 
For the 10 000 checks recorded for each year of the reference period by the AID (General 
Inspectorate), the number of reports was 70, then 68, then 23. 
In the case of Sweden, the report gave the total number (177) of refund applicatiOns reJeCted in 
1995 (ftrst year following accesssion) - which should not be confused with an administrative 
penalty. 
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the judicial action to which some cases may of course lead, confine themselves to 
submitting the obligatory report to the Commission on the most serious cases. 
Consequently, the targets set by Article 209a of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
principle of assimilation are not met. With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
and in particular the provisions of the new Article 280, the work on harmonisation which 
remains to be done to ensure equivalent protection in all the Member States is all the 
greater. 
Admittedly, a picture of a reasonable degree of uniformity emerges from the data 
on the integrated administration and control system, which is part of the trend towards a 
common definition of the rules on administration, inspection and penalties. The 
equivalence of inspection systems is also ensured by the Community rules on the checks 
to be carried out, including ex post checks, on recipients of Community aid, and on the 
findings of these checks, which ensure that irregularities will be detected and the most 
serious cases reported in accordance with fairly clear common legislation. 
On the other hand, the deterrent nature of the measures undertaken, or the 
equivalence of the penalty systems, is not always clearly apparent, depending on the 
areas of expenditure particularly. In the field of direct aid, the penalty is incorporated into 
the control and management system and produces definite effects, whereas in the other 
areas of EAGGF Guarantee Section expenditure administrative penalties are not clearly 
monitored at national level. This leaves legal action, which is very cumbersome, and the 
rectification of irregular situations by means of clearance of the accounts; but this does 
not tie in with the Union's anti-fraud strategy, which is directed towards penalising the 
offenders not the Member States. 
* 
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4. GEl'liERAL CONCLUSION 
Although the Union's anti-fraud strategy is based on a policy of criminal law 
enforcement directed against those who defraud the budget, it is also concerned with the 
uniform management of less serious irregularities in order to afford the effective and 
equivalent protection of Community finances now embodied in the Treaties. Whether we 
are considering structural or agricultural policies, there is a prevailing feeling, following 
an analysis of the national reports, that discussions should begin on the application of 
administrative penalties as a management tool and as a means of regulating aid schemes 
for which the reporting of the most serious dysfunctions should not be the only policy of 
deterrence. 
The way in which checks are carried out in the two areas under consideration here 
(own resources and Structural Funds) shows the differences in treatment and knowledge 
which can develop between the different areas of the Community budget, in dir_ect 
opposition to the principle of equivalence embodied in the Amsterdam Treaty. It is not 
even in -the spirit of Article 209a of the Maastricht Treaty, and its "assimilation" 
principle. Whatever the organisational reasons given, the degree of responsibility of local 
departments and more generally of public authorities, there is no denying that the 
information provided on the checks carried out into structural expenditure and especially 
the results of these checks (about ten cases in the entire Union) is extremely thin. Is there 
any area of a national budget involving comparable sums of money in which such a small 
proportion of replies would be received as followed the Commission's additional 
questionnaire on the Structural Funds? The shortcomings uncovered by this comparative 
analysis demonstrate the need for a detailed discussion and new initiatives on the part of 
the Union if we are to come close to achieving the objectives of effective and equivalent 
protection of Community finances. 
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